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ASSIGNMENT OF CONTRACT RIGHTS
This subject has been much discussed under the heading
"alienability of choses in action." In continuing the discussion
our first step should be to abandon altogether the term "chose in
action." Its linguistic construction is faulty, in that its individual
words lead one to think of something very different from that
which the expression as a whole now denotes. There is no
"chose" or thing or rcs. There is a right (or claim): against some
person. In this article we shall speak in terms of rights (or
claims) and not about "choses."
It is even more important that we should cease to use such a
phrase as "assignment of contract." Whatever definition we
choose for the word "contract," it is not possible to construct
accurate rules by the use of such a phrase. If a contract is defined as consisting of the facts operating to create a binding obligation-offer, acceptance, consideration, etc.-these facts are
merely a part of recorded history and surely cannot be assignedL
It is meaningless to speak of assigning a past event. If a contract is defined as a promise enforceable at law, we are merely
placing emphasis upon one of the operative facts and indicating
that it is in fact operative. A promise is merely a past event and
cannot properly be said to be assignable by the promisee; much
less can a promise be assigned by the promisor who made it, and
it would be equally erroneous to say that either party to a bilateral
contract can assign both promises. If contract is defined as de(207)
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noting the legal relations of the parties created by agreement or
promise, it is again erroneous to say that the "contract" can or
cannot be assigned. Some of the legal relations can be assigned
and some cannot. The legal relations created by any particular
contract must be analyzed and the assignability of each one must
be considered separately.
The legal relations created by a contract are in various combinations; they can always be analyzed, however, into rights,
powers, privileges, and immunities, each havings its necessary correlative. The present article will not consider the assignability of
powers, privileges or immunities. They may in some cases be
assignable. In the law of agency is to be found the old maxim
"delegatwu delegare non potest," indicating that the power of an
agent is not assignable. We know, however, that this maxim
does not tell the whole story.' The most important of the legal
relations created by contract is the relation of right and duty.
The problem of assignment in connection with this relation is the
subject of the present article; and it is restricted to rights and duties that are created by contract.
DEFINITION

To say that one person has a "right" against another means
that he has the aid of organized society in controlling the conduct
of that other person in some respect. Exactly the same idea is
expressed when we say that that other person is under a legal duty
to the first. The one who has the right is in the superior or more
advantageous position; the duty bearer is in the inferior or less
advantageous position. A contract may create in the one person
rights to more than one performance; also, it may create rights
in each of the contracting parties against the other.
Let us determine first what is meant by the assignment of a
right. A simple illustration will be of service.
Let us suppose that A has a right that B shall pay him $ioo.
It is established law that A has power to assign this right to C.
'In Barber Agency Co. v. Co-op. Barrel Co., 133 Minn. 207, i58 N. W.
38 (igs6), it is said: "It is the universal rule that an agent cannot transfer
to another powers calling for the exercise 6f discretion, skill, or judgment."
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It is also established law that the assignment is operative without
the consent of B. After the assignment B is under the same duty
as before; that is, he must still pay $ioo at the time and place
specified. The correlative right, however, is no longer in A; it is
in C. The social assistance formerly at A's command is now
available to C and is not available to A.
If the foregoing is correct, an assignment of an existing
right is an act of the possessor of that right which operates to extinguish the right of the assignor and to create an exactly similar
right in the assignee. This definition is in terms of legal operation-of the effect of the assignor's act upon.the action of organized society. It is not a descriptive definition enabling us to
recognize an act of assignment when we see one.
Such a definition as the foregoing renders some service, but
it is not sufficient standing alone. In order to predict legal operation we must be able to recognize the facts that will bring it about.
This is true even though the courts do not start in the beginning
with completed descriptive definitions of facts and definite rules
of law determining the legal operation of those facts. Perfect
definition and fixed rule are the final goal toward which the courts
are striving; they are a goal which, as Judge Cardozo tells us, is
never actually reached.2 In every decision of a case the court may
assume a definition and assert a rule; but the facts and decision
of that very case add to the inductive basis used by the next court
in remaking the definition and correcting the rule.
The law does not start with definitions and general rules
already crystallized and put into definite words. Instead, some
events occur; A acts and B complains thereof to a court. The
court must determine what society will do about it; this is a deter'The Nature of the Judicial Process (92), passim; especially at p. x66:
"I was much troubled in spirit, in my first years upon the bench, to find how
trackless was the ocean on which I had embarked. I sought for certainty.
I was oppressed and disheartened when I found that the quest for it was
futile . . . As the years have gone by, and as I have reflected more and

more upon the nature of the judicial process, I have become reconciled to the
uncertainty, because I have grown to see it as inevitable. I have grown to
see that the process in its highest reaches is not discovery, but creation; and
that the doubts and misgivings, the hopes and fears, are part of the travail
of mind, the pangs of birth and the pangs of death, in which principles that
have served their day expire, and new principles are born."
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mination of the legal operation. of the particular events by judicially operating because of them. No second series of events is
exactly like the first; and even if it were, it could not be predicted
with certainty that a second court, or even the same court, would
react to the events in the same fashion. In the course of time
there are many series of events with many adjudications thereon.
By using the multitude of records a jurist or legal scholar can
make rules and definitions. He classifies the judicial and executive reactions of society (the legal operation) and the facts that
caused these reactions. By careful analysis he can determine the
legal operation that certain facts will produce and can specify the
facts that will produce the operation. Thus be creates stated
rules of societal action and defines facts with reference to that
action. His chief if not only interest is to determine what the
legal operation will be, what society will do about it. He is not
writing a general natural history or preparing a descriptive
"movie" of the world. If his work is well done, however, he
will discover the essentials in similar series of events, and will describe in photographic fashion the facts that produce a certain
legal effect.
How, then, shall we describe an assignment? Shall .the term
be used to include all the facts necessary to produce the legal effect stated in the foregoing definition (the substitution of right in
the assignee in place of the assignor), or shall it be restricted to
some one or a few of those facts? This depends solely on usage
and convenience; but it is no easy task to determine what "usage"
is or what "convenience" requires. A statement of the rules of
law will require a full and accurate enumeration of the facts that
produce any juristic result, and each fact so enumerated must be
identified and described. An attempt at a descriptive definition
follows.
As assignment is an expression of intention by the assignor
that his right shall pass to the assignee."
This definition, without going into any fine analysis of act or
intent, dedicates the term "assignment" to a certain bit of conduct
'For this form of definition the writer is indebted to Professor Samuel
Will;sion.
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by the assignor, the objective expression of an intention to substitute a new right-holder. It might be criticised because it tells
us absolutely nothing about the legal operation of this expression
of the assignor, since courts and lawyers are interested in facts
only with respect to their legal operation (excluding for the present "evidential" facts). But it is not convenient to include ir the
definition all the facts necessary to produce the substitution of a
new right-holder, because more than one combination of facts will
produce that result. "The law" cannot be compressed into a definition. It is convenient to pick out the central fact common to all
such combinations, describe it as in the definition above, and then
to proceed to state what other facts in combination with this one
will produce the substitution mentioned.
In order that an expression of an intention by an assignor
may be operative to substitute a right in the assignee, there must
be an existing right that can be assigned, and the expression of
intention by the assignor must be in a mode that has been adjudicated to be effective. Several modes have been held effective;
but we cannot say with assurance that other modes will not be
.so held. An assignment is operative if the assignor's expression
is accompanied by a consideration paid; if it consists of the delivery, along with words of gift, of a "document of title" (a document executed by the debtor acknowledging his duty and describing the performance, due); or if the assignor's intention is expressed by a written and delivered documentary assignment
(sealed or unsealed). There is a strong tendency for the courts
to give legal operation to any oral expression of present intent to
assign. An exact determination of the facts that will be recognized as operative will not be undertaken in the present article;
but a distinction between an assignment and a promise to assign
will be briefly noted.
PROMISES TO MAKE AN ASSIGNMENT

If the holder of a contract right makes a promise for a sufficient consideration to assign it to another, what is the legal operation of the transaction? Beyond question such a promise is a
valid contract if there is no legal impediment to the assignment
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of such a right as that involved. There would be a legally enforceable duty to the promisee to perform in accordance with the
promise as in the case of any other contract. 4 But how does such
a promise to assign affect the legal relations of the obligor (the
debtor) to the assignor and the assignee? It is quite impossible
to answer this question in one general statement, because the term
"promise to assign" has several distinct meanings.
In some cases the "promise to assign" has been held to be
itself a completed assignment, extinguishing the right of the assignor against the debtor and creating a similar right in the promisee. In such cases the "promise to assign" is self-executing and
makes the "promisee" in fact an assignee. Such a holding is quite
correct if the words and conduct accompanying the "promise to
assign" express an intention to convey the right immediately.
That the assignor's words are in promissory form is not conclusive to the contrary. It is clear that such an intention may exist
and may be expressed, even though the parties contemplate the
subsequent execution of a documentary assignment. In such case
the document is to be a mere memorial of an already operative
transaction and is not itself to be the operative assignment. 5
On the other hand a promise that the promisor will on his
own behalf collect the money due him and thereafter pay that
specific money over to the promisee is not an assignment.8 The
'Hughes v. Burwell, 113 Va. 598, 75 S. E. 230 (1912).
Where for a valuable consideration a promise was made to assign certain insurance policies, it has been held that a subsequent formal assignment
of the policies was not in fraud of creditors or an illegal preference, since
the assignee's right really dated from the time of the promise: In re Grandy,
146 Fed. 318 (19o6), (formal assignment delayed because insurance company
required certain forms); Wilder v. Watts, 138 Fed. 426 (i9o5), (here the
promise was to insure certain property and to assign the policy so obtained).
See also McDonald v. Daskam, z16 Fed. 276 (9o2); In re Dier, 296 Fed. 816
(924),
(here a delivery of stock certificates was not an illegal preference,
because in consideration of a loan the borrower had promised to incorporate
and to assign the stock to the lender).
'Carey v. Chase, 197 Iowa 1239, 175 N. W. 6o (xgig), (promise by a
surety that whatever she might get from a certain company she would apply
in payment of that company's debt to the plaintiff); Stock Growers Bank
v. Milisich, 233 Pac. 41 (Nev. 1925), (promise to a lender to repay out of a
third person's notes held by the promisor) ; Patterson v. Bank, 236 S. W. 13o
(Tex., 1922), (promise to pay a debt with proceeds of sale of crops) ; Hobbs
v. McLean, 117 U. S. 567 (1885), (a promise to pay out of moneys to be
received on a contract with the United States is not within the federal statutory regulation of assignments).
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promisor's right against the debtor is not thereby extinguished,
nor is a right against the debtor created in the promisee. Such a
promise is a promise to collect and to pay out of the proceeds.
Words of present assignment, however, are not made inoperative
as a present assignment by the fact that the assignor at the same
time promises to collect the money due as an agent of the assignee
and to pay it over to him.r
For an effective assignment it is necessary that the right assigned shall be clearly identified. 8 A promise to assign book accounts as security is not operative as a present assignment if the
accounts are not clearly indicated and the terms of the assignment are left to future agreement or if the parties understand
that the promisor is to be privileged to collect the accounts and use
the money in his own affairs. In such a case there is great probability that the agreement is too uncertain in subject matter or
terms to be regarded even as a valid contract between the promisor and the promisee.
ASSIGNEE NOT AN AGENT OR ATTORNEY

It was once believed that a right could not be assigned. A
"right" was conceived of as a sort of nebulous, ethereal, personal
relation.1 0 In the nature of things it could not be assigned. This
A promise to pay an attorney compensation out of the proceeds of the litigation is not an assignment, because it creates only a right in the attorney
against the client and does not create a right in the attorney against the party
; Trist
who is being sued: Cameron v. Boeger, 200 Ill. 84, 65 N. E. 69o (9)
v. Child, 21 Wall. 441 (U. S., 1874).
'Cogan v. Conover Mfg. Co., 69 N. J. Eq. 8o9, 64 At. 973 (19o6).
'Thus, a promise by a mortgagor to keep the property insured for the
benefit of the mortgagee is not an assignment, even though the mortgagor
should thereafter cause a policy to be executed in his own name. There was
no promise to assign some designated and identified right. Stearns v. Quincy
Ins. Co., 124 Mass. 6I (1878).
"In re Stiger, 2o2 Fed. 791 (913), 209 Fed. 148.
"The rule that a "chose in action" was not assignable "is better explained
as a logical consequence of the archaic view of a contract as creating a
strictly personal obligation." POLLOcK, CoNTRAcTs (Williston's ed., i9o6) 278.
"A personal relation in the very nature of things cannot be assigned . . .
where one has a mere right against another, there is nothing that is capable
of transfer." Ames, The Inalienability of Choses in Action, in LEcruas ON
LEGM. HISTORY, 210. Dean Ames seems to have been subconsciously defining
"assignment" as a physical tradition of some sort of subject matter. As defined herein, its operation is to extinguish and to create, just as in the case
of any conveyance of property in land or chattels-. A contract right is no
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supposed difficulty is entirely eliminated by a closer analysis of
the concepts expressed by "right" and "relation." Just as in the
science of physics, such an analysis shows that the ethereaf nebula
has substance perceivable by the senses.
In the simple illustration given above, A had a right that B
should pay him $ioo. This is now analyzed to mean nothing
more than that the agents of organized society will assist A in
inducing or compelling B to pay over certain money. There are
various modes in which this societal assistance is given. It is this
great fact of societal assistance that constitutes the legal "relation"
of "right" and "duty." While jurists were for some centuries
saying that a right cbuld not be assigned, they were as judges
going steadily on transferring their societal assistance from the
assignor to the assignee. In order to make this court action appear to be consistent with their theory that a right cannot be assigned, the jurists said that the "right" was still in the assignor,
but that he had given to the assignee a power of attorney to
enforce it for him. A having assigned to C his right that B
should pay $xoo, when asked whether thereafter C had a right
against B the jurists said "no"; but when asked whether A could
control the suit against B or could give B a valid discharge they
also said "no"; 11 and when asked whether C could control the
suit and could give a valid discharge they said "yes"; and when
asked by the executing sheriff to whom he should pay the money
collected, they said "pay it to C."
In invoking judicial or executive compulsion against B, is C
(the assignee) acting as the agent or attorney for A? 12 Assuredly not. Such an idea never enters the head of either A or
C, and for centuries not a word expressing an intention to make
C the agent of A has been required or used in assignment. An
different in this respect from a land right or a horse right. See Professor
Walter W. Cook, The Alienability of ChoSes i Action, 29 HAnv. L. Rsv. 816
(19W5).
"Welch v. Mandeville, i Wheat. 233 (U. S., 1816); Legh v. Legh, i Bos.
& P. 447 (x799).
"This was the particular fiction accepted in early times; and it has perqisted to a considerable extent even to the present time. The view here stated
is presented with careful analysis by Professor Cook, loc. cit., note 1o.
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agent is one who is acting in his principal's behalf; C is acting
solely for his own interest. Because of the interest of the principal that is being served, an agent is said to occupy a fiduciary
relation and to owe duties to the principal connoted by the word
"fiduciary." After an unconditional assignment to C, A has no
further interest to be served, A's jural relations are not intehlded
to be affected by C's action, and C owes no fiduciary duties to A.
In some jurisdictions it may still be proper for C to bring
suit in A's name; but this in no way affects what is stated above."'
If there are still cases where it is necessary for C to sue in A's
name, this is a mere empty formality, as it long was in the former

courts of common law.
It is no longer even "proper" to sue in the name of A in

states where by statute the suit must be in the name of "the real
party in interest." On proof that the right has been assigned, the
suit will be dismissed unless it is shown that A is suing as the
agent and attQrney of the assignee C and that C is the real plaintiff.1 ' So far from the assignee being the agent of the assignor,
it now appears that the assignor can sue only as the agent of the
assignee. If the "assignee" merely holds a power of attorney or
is an assignee for collection and remission of proceeds to the
assignor, he is not the "real party in interest" in whose name the
15
suit must, under many statutes, be brought.
It appears that in Connecticut the assignee may still sue in the assignor's
name and thereby prevent the defendant from counterclaiming in the same
action on a separate claim which he has against the assignee, the real plaintiff.
Lowndes v. City Bank, 79 Codln. 693, 166 Atl. 514 (907). It should be observed that this is not a holding that the assignee is a mere agent enforcing
the right of the assignor. Its effect is that it gives to the assignee an additional advantage, one that in other States he would not have and one to which
the conmon notions of justice would not entitle him.
U Parker v. Simon, 231 X. Y. 503, 33 N. E. 5o3 (192); Whiting v.
Gliss, 217 N. Y. 333, I N. E. xo82 (1g6); Looney v. Dist. of Col., 113
U. S.2s8 (88s).
Spencer v. Standard Corp., 237 N. Y. 479, 144 N. E. 479 (1924) ; Crum
v. Stanley, 55 Neb. 351, 7s N. W. 8s (1898).
An assignee is not an agent or attorney; conversely, a mere agent or attorney is not an assignee. If it is clearly expressed that the agent is to collect and
is by juck collecion to effect an assignment, there is no assignment before the
act of collection. See Farmers' L.& T. Co. v. Winthrop, 238 N. Y. 477, 144
N. E. 686 (x924).
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ASSIGNMENT OF DUTIES

Before proceeding to determine what rights are assignable
and what are not assignable, the easier problem of the assignment
of duties will be disposed of. This disposal consists of the flat
statement that no duty can ever be effectively assigned, if we adhere to our description of an assignment as a unilateral expression
of the assignor. Applying that definition to duties instead of
rights, we have: An assignment is an expression of intention by

the assignor that his duty shall immediately pass to the assignee.
Many a debtor wishes that by such an expression he could get
rid of his debts. Any debtor can express such an intention, but
it is not operative to produce such a hoped-for result. It does not
cause society to relax its compulsion against him and direct it
toward the assignee as his substitute. In spite of such an "assignment," the debtor's duty remains absolutely unchanged. The
performance required by a duty can often be delegated; but by
such a delegation the duty itself is not escaped. 16
Suppose the following cases: i. A is under contract with B
to deliver for compensation a ton of coal to B's house. A employs C to deliver it for him. By so doing A is not a 'epudiator
of his contract; but he is still bound by the contractual duty. If
C delivers the coal, A has a right to payment of the compensation by B. If C does not deliver the coal, B has a right to damages against A for breach of duty. C's failure to deliver the coal
may also give to both A and B a right to damages against C.
This depends on whether C made a valid contract with A; if he
did, A can sue for its breach, '7 and nearly everywhere B can sue
C as an obligee-beneficiary of his contract with A.
U "It has been uniformly held that a man cannot assign his liabilities under
a contract, but one who is bound so as to bear an unescapable liability may
delegate the performance of his obligation to another, if the liability be of
such a nature that its performance by another will be substantially the same
thing as performance by the promisor himself. In such circumstances the
performance of the third party is the act of the promisor, who remains liable
under the contract and answerable in damages if the performance be not in

strict fulfillment of the contract." Crane Ice Cream Co. v. Terminal Freezing Co., 128 At. 280, 283 (Md. i925). In the foregoing, "liability" means legal
duty.
"Explosive Chemical Co. v. Gray &
333 (1g25).

!Co.,

2o7 N. Y. Supp. 638, 124 Misc.
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2. A is under contract with B to play the part of Hamlet in
B's theater. In B's absence, A employs C to play Hamlet and C
actually does so. In this case A has no right to the agreed compensation; and instead B has a right to damages from A for
breach of contract. No more than in the first case could A escape his duty by such an arrangement with C; but in addition, A
could not perform vicariously as he could and did do in the first
case.
A duty can never -be escaped by assignment or delegation;
but any duty can be extinguished by performance. Some duties
require a performance by a specific person; others do not. In
the coal case, the performance required was the delivery of coal
at B's house, and it made no difference whether by team or by
truck or by whom driven. In the Hamlet case, the performance
required was the physical acting of A, involving the co-ordination of A's trained body and brain. Whether or not a contractual
duty requires personal performance by a specific individual can be
determined only by interpreting the words used in the light of experience. In many cases there will be ample room for a difference of opinion. But whether the performance required is a personal performance or not, the legal duty is not escaped by an
8
assignment or delegation of performance.'
It is easy to put striking cases where the performance required is not solely the personal action of the contractor. A contracts with B that C will not expose a trade secret or that D will
play Hamlet. Here A can neither escape his duty by assignment,
delegate performance to ,a new person, nor satisfy his duty by
performing himself. The contract puts neither C nor D under
any duty whatever; but the duty of A can be satisfied only by the
silence of C and the acting of D.
S"This ordinarily is all the books mean when they state the proposition
in general terms--that a contract imposing liability cannot be assigned; that
the assignment of such a contract does not, as a rule, relieve the assignor from
responsibility." Atlantic & N. C. R. Co. v. Atlantic & N. C. Co., 147 N. C.

368, 61 S. F. 185 (i08).

"What is meant is, not that-contracts involving obligations not special and
personal can be assigned in the full sense of shifting the burden of an obligation on to a substituted contractor, any more than when it is special and
personal; but that in the first case the assignor may rely on the act of another
as performance by himself, whereas in the second case he cannot." Tolhurst

v. Associated Mfrs., [i9o2] 2 K. B. 66o, 669.

-
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If it is impossible for A to assign his duty, how can he get
rid of it? Only by some one of the recognized methods by which
a contractual duty is discharged. Most of these require the assent of the obligee, the party having the right correlative to the
duty to be discharged. One of these methods is called "novation," by which, with the obligee's assent, a substitution of debtors
is effected. This is not assignment.
WHAT RIGHTS ARE ASSIGNABLE

It is almost safe to say that all contract rights are assignable
-almost but not quite. We are far removed from the notion
that all rights are strictly personal and therefore not assignable;
but it is still often said that some rights are so personal in character as to be non-assignable. It is believed that this latter limitation on assignability has no more foundation than the earlier
and more general one.
Let us consider a few specific cases. I. A contracts with B
to act as B's valet. Surely, it will be said, B's right is so personal
that it cannot be assigned. But no, the contrary is believed to be
correct although no decision pro or con has been seen by the
writer. By this statement it is not meant to say that the character of the service can in any way be changed by assignment.
The right of B is that A shall act as B's valet, not that A shall
act as valet for whom it may concern. Anyone ought to know
that serving as valet to a cross, ill, miserly, old curmudgeon is not
the same performance as serving a healthy, happy-go-lucky, generous, young prince. Therefore, when B assigns his right against
A, he must assign it as it is. He cannot by assignment to C create in C a right that A shall act as C's valet. That would be a
different right to a different performance. But B can assign to
C the right that A shall serve as B's valet; and if A shall commit
a breach it will be C who gets the damages measured by the value
of the promised service.1 9
" .This, of course, is oil the assumption that B made it clear by his words
of assignment that he was no longer to be regarded as the possessor of a right
against A, either to performance or to damages--that a true assignment by
sustitution of a new beneficial right-holder was intended.
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Suppose that A contracts with B to supply all the coal
that B may need in a business that B is then conducting or all the
coal that B may need in his household use. Just as in the case of
the valet, B's right is assignable ;20 but B cannot by assignment to
C create in C a right that A shall supply all the coal that C may
need in his business or his household. This is true even though
at the time of the attempted assignment B sells his business or his
house to C and C continues therein. The needs of a business or
a house run by C are not identical with those of the same business
or house run by B. B's power of assignment, therefore, is limited to the creation in C of the very same right that B possessed,
namely, the right that B's needs shall be supplied.
Of course, it is possible for A to contract with B so as to
give B a right that A shall valet any person or shall supply a certain house with coal without regard to its occupant. This right,
aslike the previous ones, can be assigned, the performance after
21
assignment.
before
as
signment remaining exactly the same
To show that the decision in the foregoing cases is not fanciful let us consider two more cases. 3. C wishes that-his son
B shall have a valet, but not that B shall have a legal right. C
therefore contracts with A that A shall serve B as valet, and also
that the primary legal right and the secondary right to the value
of the services shall be in C alone. No one would doubt that this
is a valid contract, that C has a right that A shall serve B as valet,
or that C has a right to the value of the services in case of breach
by A. This is exactly the result produced in case i. No sufficient reason appears why they cannot produce this result by assignment as well as by direct contract. No doubt it may be some
disadvantage to A to owe a duty to severe, hard-hearted, old Mr.
C instead of to young, easy-going B; but it is no more so in this
2.

" Here again, it is assumed that B means the damages to go with the
primary right.
'Thus where the defendant contracted with X and his "successors or
assigns" to supply his premises "222 Main St. all electric service for lighting,
fans and heating required by the consumer," it was, held that the defendant
was bound to supply the promised service to the plaintiff, an assignee occupying
the premises. Leader Co. v. Little Rock L & E. Co., 12o Ark. 221, 179 S. W.
358 (xgi5). There was a similar holding in Tolhurst v. Associated Port. Cem.
Mfrs., [r9o3] A. C. 414.
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kind of a case than in any other assignment. The social service
rendered by the assignability of rights so far overweighs the disadvantage to the debtor incidental to a change in creditors that
the latter is disregarded. In no case however, is the actual service required of A changed by the assignment.
4. C wishes that his son B shall have an ample supply of
coal, but that B shall have no legal right. C therefore contracts
with A that A shall supply B's business or B's household with
coal, the primary right to delivery and the secondary right to the
value of the coal in case of breach to be in C alone. This creates
in C exactly the same right that was produced by the assignment
in case 2. Further, C's right that A shall supply B with coal is
assignable by C. On C's death his right would pass to his personal representative. This in itself shows that there is nothing
in the nature of a right that A shall serve or supply B to make it
22
non-assignable.
In almost all cases where a "contract" is said to be non-assignable because it is "personal," what is meant is not that the
contractor's right is not assignable but that the performance required by his duty is a personal performance and that an attempt
to perform by a substituted person would not discharge the contractor's duty. In this sense the statement is correct if a proper
interpretation of the agreement shows that the performance by a
particular person is required.
A second possible correct meaning is that personal performance by the contractor is a condition precedent to his right to performance by the other party, and an assignee of that right will
' It should be observed that the contracts between C and A in cases 3 and
4 might have been of a very different sort. They might have been made so that
B would be a donee-beneficiary in each case. If so made, in nearly all jurisdictions there would be created in B both a primary right to performance and
(in case of breach) a secondary right to damages. No doubt such a right as
C (the promisee) gets in this case could be assigned; but this is not the right
that was assigned in cases i and 2. No doubt, also, the right of B (the
beneficiary) could be assigned; but B was not a donee-beneficiary in any doneeof the
four cases put--such was not in fact the contract made. In cases 3 and 4,
the services and the coal were sold to C and not to B; on performance of the
service or delivery of the coal A could maintain an action of debt against C
for the price, and on breach by A the sole right to damages would
C.
The point made is that however unusual a result may be reached bybeanin assignment, exactly the same result may be.reached by a direct contract. That
the result is an unusual one is irrelevant in either case.
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fail in case of non-fulfilment of this condition. In this case, as
23 If it
in the preceding one, performance cannot be delegated.
should be meant that the assignee of the right would fail even
though the contracting assignor himself performs as originally
agreed, thus fulfilling the condition precedent, the statement is
entirely erroneous.
A third possible correct meaning is that in a bilateral contract the contractor has no power to assign both his right and his
duty. Thus it has been said: "When rights arising out of a contract are coupled with obligations to be performed by the conit
tractor and involve such a relation of personal confidence that 24
must have been intended that the rights should be exercised
and the obligations performed by him alone, the contract, includIn the following cases the performance due was held to be personal and
not delegable to another person in such manner that his performance would
either discharge the assignor's duty or fulfil a condition precedent to the assignor's right to compensation; Wooster v. Crane, 73 N. J. Eq. 22, i66 AtI.
Io93 (i9o7), (services as printer and publisher); Foster v. Callaghan & Co.,
248 Fed. 944 (igi8), (same); Linn Co. Abstract Co. v. Beechley, 124 Iowa
146, 99 N. W. 702 (9o4), (services as abstractor of titles) ; Corson v. Lewis,
77 Neb. 446, iog N. W. 735 (19o6), (services as attorney at law); N. Y.
Bank Note Co. v. Hamilton Bank Note Co., i8o N. Y. 280, 73 N. E. 48
(i9o5), (services as selling agent) ; Paige v. Faure, 229 N. Y. '14, 129 N. E.
(192o), (same); Barber Agency Co. v. Co-op. Barrel Co., 133 Minn. 207, i58.
N. W. 38 (i916), (same); New England Cabinet Works v. Morris, 226 Mass.
246, 115 N. E. 315 (1917), (services in designing and installing druggists'
fixtures); Deaton v. Lawson, 40 Wash. 486, 82 Pac. 879 (i9o5), (services as
physician); Thomas-Bonner Co. v. Hooven, 284 Fed. 386 (1922), (sales agency
contract) ; Beard v. Beard, 254 S. W. 430, 2oo Ky. 4 (1923), (services in giving support and a home for a mother with her son).
In the following cases the performance due was held not to be personal;
the performance by the substitute to whom the assignor delegated it was held
to discharge the duty of the assignor and to fulfil the condition precedent to
the right assigned to the assignee: Atlantic & N. C. R. Co. v. Atlantic Co., 147
N. C. 368, 6i S. E. 185 (iqo8), (delivery of cordwood); Browne & Co. v.
Sharkey Co., 58 Or. 480, ii5 Pa. 156 (igii), (printing advertising booklets) ;
Galey v. Mellon, i72 Pa. 443, 133 AtI. 56o (x896), (drilling oil wells) ; Overby
v. Mona Trust, 240 S. W. 581 (Tex., 1922), (same); Devlin v. Mayor, etc.,
of N. Y., 63 N. Y. 8, 23 N. Y. Supp. 891 (1875), (cleaning city streets).
"In its proper sense, a "right" is a claim to certain conduct by another
person, enforced by society. It is evident that, in this sense, the possessor
of a right never "exercises" it. It is always the other party, the one owing
the correlative duty, who is to perform or "exercise." The form of language
used shows that the court was thinking of performance by the contractor who
assigns, and hardly at all of that contractor's right to performance by another.
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ing both his rights and his obligations cannot be assigned." 25
As has been seen previously, a legal duty cannot be escaped by
assignment; and, as has just been said, a truly personal performance cannot be delegated.
It is sometimes said that where the contract makes it the
duty of one party thereto to render a personal service, special
trust and confidence being reposed in him, a valid assignment is
impossible "as long as such contract is executory on the part of
the party in whom such trust and confidence is reposed." 26
While this is correct if the assignment is meant to include both
duties and rights, it is not correct if it is meant to say that a right
cannot be assigned as long as a duty of the assignor, requiring
his personal performance remains executory. The assignor's
right is assignable in spite of the personal character of the performance he is still under a duty to render; but if it is a right that
was conditional upon some personal performance by the assignor,
it remains so conditional after the assignee gets the right by assignment.2 7 Thus, a school teacher can assign his wages to be=Delaware Co. v. Diebold Safe & Lock Co., 133 U. S. 473, 488 (189o).
This was quoted in Burck v. Taylor, 152 U. S. 634 (1893), by Brewer, I., who
added: "the contractor could never have transferred an interest in it to the
plaintiff so as to vest in him a right to take part in the work or a subsequent
right to recover from the State on completion of the work." The words "right

to take part" show that Brewer also was thinking of the performance due
from the contractor who was the assignor, and meant that performance by a
substituted party would not have fulfilled a condition precedent to the right
to payment. Judge Jackson, in a dissenting opinion, distinguishes more clearly
between performance of duty and the enforcement of right against another
when he says: "There is a class of cases where the services to be rendered are
of such a personal character that they cannot be assigned; but where is the authority that holds that where a firm is a contractor to do certain work a member of the firm cannot assign or transfer his share of the profits to arise therefrom?" The case is no doubt well decided for the reason that the defendant, a
second assignee, had fully performed the building contract under a novation
made with the State.
_PAGE,
CONMACTS, (2d ed.), §2248.
"American Lith. Co. v. Ziegler, 216 Mass. 287, 103 N. E. 909 (1x14). In
Montgomery v. DePicot, 153 Calif. 509, 96 Pac. 3o5 (igo8), the vendee of land
on credit tendered his own notes secured by the agreed mortgage (and at the
trial the notes of the assignor also) and got a decree for specific performance
against the vendor. In American Bonding & T. Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.
Co., 124 Fed. 866 (x9o3), the court said: "There is nothing in the existence
of such counter obligation to prevent an assignment by the creditor of his
right after he has performed that obligation, and thus perfected his right, or,
even before, if no attempt is made to shift the duty of performing it from
himself to the assignee."
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come due under an existing contract even though his services are
still to be rendered; but the assignee's right will be exactly the
same as the assignor's, conditional upon proper performance of
the work by the teacher in person.
Of course, even in cases where the required performance is
not "personal," the non-personal performance that is required
may be a condition precedent to the right to payment contracted
for in return. In such cases the right is assignable before fulfillment of the condition precedent; and the fact that fulfillment
of this condition is delegated to the assignee of the right to pay28
ment does not in any way affect the validity of the assignment.
Thus, where the duty to pay for coal is conditional on certain
instalment deliveries being made, the making of these deliveries
is a condition precedent to the seller's right to payment by the
buyer; but the making of these deliveries is in no sense a personal
performance. A tender of delivery by an assignee of the seller's
right would fulfill the condition precedent and the assignee could
then enforce the right against the buyer.
An attempt by the assignor to assign both his right and his
It has been supposed that the right was too personal to be assigned in American Smelting & R. Co. v. Belden Min. Co., 127 U. S. 379 (1888). The trouble
was, however, that the assignor not only assigned his right to delivery of ore,
but also became unready to perform his purely personal duty of crushing,
sampling, and assaying the ore so as to determine the amount to be paid. His
right to delivery (and therefore the right of the assignee also) was conditional
upon his continued readiness to perform in person. Had he fulfilled this condition, the assignee should have won the suit. The right to delivery was not nonassignable.
="In principle it would not impair the rights of the assignee, or destroy
the assignable quality of the contract or claim, that the assignee, as between
himself and the assignor, has assumed some duty in performing the conditions precedent to a perfected cause of action, or is made the agent or substitute of the assignor in the performance of the contract. If the service to be
rendered or the condition to be performed is not necessarily personal, and such
as can only with due regard to the intent of the parties, and the rights of the
adverse party, be rendered or performed by the original contracting party, and
the latter has not disqualified himself from the performance of the contract,
the mere fact that the individual representing and acting for him is the assignee,
and not the mere agent or servant, will not operate as a rescission of, or constitute a cause for terminating the contract. Whether the agent for performing
the contract acts under a naked power, or a power coupled with an interest,
cannot affect the character or vary the effect of the delegation of power by
the original contractor. Hackley, the original contractor, was at no time discharged from his obligations to the city, nor was he disqualified for the performance of the contract, but was at all times in a position to perform his part
of this agreement." Devlin v. Mayor, etc., of N. Y. 63 N. Y. 8, 23 N. Y.
Supp. 891 (1875).
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duty under a bilateral contract will sometimes be interpreted as
a repudiation of his duty, particularly where the performance
required by the duty is personal to the assignor and not possible
of delegation. This will prevent any enforcement of the right
by the assignee thereof, 29 unless the right is wholly independent
of the duty and not conditional upon performance or readiness
to perform.
A contract right is hardly ever made non-assignable by the
fact that it is conditional 80 or is for some other reason not enforceable until a future date. A right to money not yet due can
be assigned. A right to the payment of money to become due on
condition of services yet to be rendered 81 and on condition that
the obligee does not drink intoxicants is an assignable right. The
right of the assignee is, of course, subject to the same conditions
as was the right of the assignor.
The power of assignment may exist before all of the facts
necessary to the enforceability of the right exist, as appears in
the preceding paragraph; but at least some of the operative facts
must exist. If A, expecting that he will thereafter make a loan
to B, assigns to C his right to repayment, C gets no right against
B at the time of the assignment because A had none to assign.
The same is true even though B had asked for such a loan. There
"See Crane Ice Cream Co. v. Terminal Freezing Co., 128 AUt. 280, 285
(Md.,
S925);
American Smelting & R. Co. v. Belden Min. Co., .supra; ANSON,
CONTRACTS (Corbin's ed. 1924), §303, n. 2.
Where a party has obtained a rescission of his duties under a bilateral contract, his rights dependent upon the fulfilment of such duties will normally be

rescinded also by implication. In such case, by a separate assignment of the
rights the assignee gets nothing. Tarr v. Veasey,
('9,s).

125

Md. i99, 93-Atl. 428

The only exception to the general rule seems to be in the case of a right
created by an aleatory contract where the promisor's duty of performing is
conditional upon an uncertain event and the assignment to a new party might

considerably increase the probability of the happening of this event. For this
reason the right of an insured under a policy of fire insurance has been held

not assignable.

VANCE, INsURANCE,

50. In such a case, an assignment of the

right cannot be made without changing materially the conditions and extent of
the correlative duty.
. ' It has been held that such an assignment remains effective even though
the assignor is discharged in bankruptcy after the assignment but before the
wages are earned. Citizens Loan Assn. v. Boston & M. 1. R., I96 Mass. 528.
82 N. E. 696 (i9o7); Mallin v. Wenham, 209 Ill. 252, 7o N. E. 564 (1904).
Contra: Leitch v. Northern Pac. R., 95 Mimn. 35, IO3 N. W. 704 (1905); Hupp
v. Union Pac. R., 99 Neb. 654, 157 N. W. 343 (1916).
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must at least be a contract at the time of the assignment; acceptance as well as offer must have taken place.
On the other hand, if the right against B that A purported to
assign to C afterwards comes into existence, the assignment has
been held in a number of cases to transfer the right at once to
C.82 There seems to be nothing in the interests of A and Bthe assignor and the debtor-to prevent such a result; but in giving effect to such an assignment the interests of A's creditors
should be protected. Assignments in advance of the creation of
the right assigned may easily be used in fraud of creditors.
Thus far, with the exception mentioned in note 30, we have
discovered no contract right that is not assignable. There are a
few cases, however where the welfare of the public is believed to
be involved and where the substitution of a new obligee by assignment is against the public interest. There are some statutes
forbidding assignment; and other assignments have been held
invalid by the courts on some supposed principle of public policy.
Thus, a right to a Federal pension has been made non-assignable;
and the right of a public officer to future salary not yet due has
been held non-assignable.88
PROHIBITION OF ASSIGNMENT.

The parties to a contract may themselves agree that a right
created thereby shall not be assignable. It may be regarded as
doubtful whether a mere oral agreement to this effect would invalidate a subsequent assignment to an assignee who had no notice of the agreement. But a provision of this sort in a written
contract may properly be regarded as notice to any assignee of a
right based on that contract. There are many cases where such
a prohibition in writing has been held operative to prevent any
power to assign and where the assignee failed in his action to enforce the right. Thus where an employee's time pay check was
' Field v, Mayor of N. Y., 6-N. Y. i79 (1852); Tailby v. Official Receiver,
13 App. Cas. 523 (1888).

"Stewart v. Sample, 168 Ala. 270, 53 So. 18a (igio) ; Anderson v. Branstrom, 173 Mich. I57, 39 N. W. 40 (1912); Roesch v. Worthen Co., 95 Ark.
482, I3o S. W. 55! (I91o). f
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on its face made payable only to the named payee and declared
non-transferable, and where on the detached stub of such pay
check the employee had signed an agreement that he would present the check in person and would not transfer it, it was held
that an assignee got no enforceable right.3 4 The like has been
held in several cases where trading stamps have been marked
on their face "not transferable" 85 This has been assumed to be
the rule as a matter of course in many cases.3 6

In one case, however, the United States Supreme Court has
said that a prohibition against assignment contained in a written contract was ineffective, likening the contract right to per-.
sonal chattels.37 There has been a strong tendency to hold that
goods and chattels cannot be made inalienable According to
expressions used by the Supreme Court, not only are already existing contract rights not inalienable; they cannot even be made inalienable ab initio by the party who is their original creator.
"Barringer v. Bes Line Const. Co., 23 Okla. 131, 99 Pac. 775 (9o9).
In
accord: Joint School Dist. v. Marathon Bank, 204 N. W. 471 (Wis., 1925);
Bonds-Foster L. Co. v. No. Pac. R. Co., 53 Wash. 302, 1o Pac. 877 (1o9) ;
State v. Kent, 98 Mo. App. 281, 7, S. W. io66 (ixo2); Tabler & Co. v. Sheffield Coal Co., 79 Ala. 377 (1885). Contra: Aldridge L. Co. v. Graves, 131
S. W. 846 (ipxo); Bewick Lumber Co. v. Hall, 94 Ga. 539, 21 S. E. 154
(1894), relying on a statute declaring that choses in action shall be assignable.
But Oklahoma had a similar statute, and the court rightly said that it was only
for the purpose of nullifying the old common law rule against assignment, not
for the purpose of invalidating express agreements that the contract right shall
not be assignable.
"Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Siegel, Cooper & Co., 225 Ill. App. 54o
(1922) ; holding that the assignee got no primary right by delivery with intent
to assign, and also that such delivery did not assign the secondary right to
damages for anticipatory breach in absence of evidence to show intent to do
this. In accord: Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Weber & Co., 161 Fed. 219
(Igo8). Cf. Same v. Fenster, 219 Fed. 755 (I915), saying: "The right to redeem the stamps is a property right transferable by possession while the license
to use them for advertising purposes is not transferable." The prqvision against
assignment is not discussed.
NSee discussion in the excellent case of American Bonding & T. Co. v.
Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 124 Fed. 866 (i9o3).
'Portuguese Bank v. Welles, 242 U. S. 7 (1916). The supposed policy on
which this statement was based cannot be said to have been demonstrated. See
Comment, 26 YALz L. J., 304 (1917). It should be observed that in this case
the obligor did not object to the assignment, but paid the money into court.
If he is willing to abandon his immunity, the assignee may well get the money
as against other claimants. The prohibition was not for their protection. To
the same effect is Fortunato v. Patten, 147 N. Y. 277, 52 N. Y. Supp. 872
(1895).
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There are some cases that definitely38 hold a prohibition against
assignment of a right to be invalid.
Express provisions against assignment are usually found in
bilateral contracts and are in some such generaf words as "this
contract shall not be assignable." In the pay check and trading
stamp cases this was not the case, for there the contracts were
unilateral and the prohibition was clearly directed against the
holder of the right alone' Such a general prohibition in a bilateral contract is much more likely to be directed against attempts to delegate performance of a duty by the promisor rather
than against assignment of a right by the promisee. For such a
limited purpose they should always be held valid; but they should
not be interpreted to forbid assignment of contract rights."9
ASSIGNMENT DoES NOT AFFECT PERFORMANCE,

The performance, whether action or forbearance, that an
obligor is under a duty to render cannot be changed in any material way by assignment of the right by the obligee. It must be
admitted that it is some disadvantage to a debtor that his creditor
"The Iowa Code, §9452, provides: 'Wten by the terms of an instrument
its assignment is prohibited, an assignment thereof shall nevertheless be valid."
A provision in a policy of fire insurance that it shall not be assigned before
loss is valid, because the risk is not the same with a new owner. But a provision that the policy shall be void if assigned after loss is not valid, since
the risk is not affected by.such an assignment. Spare v. Home Mut. Ins. Co.,
17 Fed. 568 (1883); Pennebaker v. Tomlinson, i Tenn. Ch. 598 (1874), (semble) ; Nease v. Insurance Co., 32 W. Va. 283, 9 S. E. 233 (i889), (semble) ;
May, Insurance (3d ed.) §386. Where a bank issued a pass book expressly
subject to all rules and regulations that might be posted thereafter in the banking room, and later the bank posted a rule that money was payable only to
the depositor in person, this rule was held void as against an assignee of the
entire deposit. Bank of U. S. v. Public Bank, 151 N. Y. Supp. 94 (iiS).
" In Lockerby v. Amon, 64 Wash. 24, 1i6 Pac. 463 (i91i), a contract for
the sale of land provided that '"no assignment of this agreement shall be valid
without the consent of Amon." It was vigorously argued that this was inserted
in order to secure payment and that on tender of payment in full by the assignee Anon must convey to him; but the court held otherwise. In accord is
Omaha v. Standard Oil Co., 55 Neb. 337, 75 N. W. 859 (1898). In a note,
35 L. R. A. (N. S.) io64, it is said that the great weight of authority is against
this decision. See Cheney v. Bilby, 74 Fed. 52 (1896); Wagner v. Cheney,
x6 Neb. 202, 2o N. W. 222 (1884); Johnson v. Eklund, 72 Minn. 195, 75 N.
W. 14 (1898). In Butler v. San Francisco Gas & E. Co., i68 Calif. 32, the
court said: "The contract expressly provided that no assignment of it should
be made by Butler (the building contractor) nor any portion of the work
sublet by him." The court held that this prohibition went only to the performance of the work and did not apply to the right to payment.

228

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

has power to substitute a new creditor without the debtor's consent. It would be a much greater disadvantage, without any particular gain to the community, to give the creditor power to
change the performance due from the debtor. We have seeh
above that if B has a right that A shall serve as his valet, he cannot by assignment make it A's duty to serve C as valet; also that
if B has a right that A shall supply his needs for coal he cannot
make it A's duty to supply the needs of C.40 In like manner, if
A owes B a debt of $ioo payable at the First National Bank on
May i, B can assign his right to the Second National Bank; but
he cannot make it A's duty to pay at the Second Bank or on any
other day than May i. If A sells his stock of hardware, business, and good will to B and promises to forbear from competition for five years, B can assign his right along with the business
to C; but he cannot by such assignment make it A's duty to
forbear to solicit hardware business in any greater territory than
the business covered previously, even though C's business may be
more widely extended.
In certain classes of cases and to a very limitedextent, it seems
that the actual performance by the obligor can be changed by an
assignment. Thus, if no particular place is specified for the payment of a debt, the debtor must search for his creditor and pay
him in person. If the creditor should assign his right, it seems
that the debtor must now seek the assignee in order to make payment. This might require the assignee to pay at a much more
distant place. There is an equal possibility, however, that it is
the original obligee and not the assignee who goes to the distant
place; and in such case the assignment would save trouble. As
business is now conducted, it is not difficult to pay at a distant
" Crane Ice Cream Co. v. Terminal Freezing Co., x28 Ati. 28o (Md., 1925),
(one having a right to all the ice he may use in his business for three years
cannot create in an assignee a right to all the ice such assignee may use in
its business) ; Frankfort & C. R. Co. v. Jackson, 153 Ky. 534, 156 S. W. io3
(1913); Kemp v. Baerselman, [i9o6] 2 K. B. 6o4, (B agreed to supply K
with "all fresh eggs that he shall require for manufacturing purposes for one
year) ; Lansden v. McCarthy, 45 Mo. io6 (1869), ("all fresh beef . . . that
might be ordered or required by B. & K. for the use and consumption of said
hotel"); Tifton, etc., R. Co. v. Bedgood, 116 Ga. 945, 43 S. E. 257 (1903),
(R.R. contracted to haul all lumber cut by H. & S.). Cf. Leader Co. v. Little
Rock R. & E. Co., 12o Ark. 221, 179 S. W. 358 (xg5) ; Tolhurst v. Associated
Port. Cem. Mfrs., [x9o3] A. C. 414.
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place through the banks or other established agencies. The possible added burden put upon the debtor by the assignment is seldom great, and thus far it has been disregarded by the courts in
the interest of the business community.
Wherever the promised performance consists partly in the
creation of new legal relations in the obligee-as in the case of a
sale of goods-it may be said that the assignment causes the performance to differ in that these legal relations must now be created in a different party. This difference is immaterial to the
40
debtor. 9
In cases where the performance of the obligor is not changed
in any way by the assignment, it may reasonably be said that the
right of the assignee is the same right as that previously held by
the assignor; but to the extent that the right can be and is slightly
changed by assignment, the assignee's right must be said to be a
new right pro tanto, similar in all other ways to that previously
held by the assignor.
DEFENSES AND "EQUITIES"

The great difference between instruments ordinarily described as "negotiable" and contracts not so described is that the
holder of a negotiable instrument frequently has power to create
a right in a transferee when he has none himself. No such power
exists in any case of. assignment as distinguished from negotiation. An assignee never gets a better right than the assignor
had. If for any reason the assignor's claim was void, voidable,
unenforceable, or conditional, so also is the claim of the assignee. 4 1 If the debtor had any defense, counterclaim, or set-off
' Usually it can be made the duty of the obligor to deliver goods into the
the assignor
possession of an assignee; not so, however, where the delivery to benefit
of the
was to enable him to render a purely personal performance for the
impossible.
this
make
would
assignee
an
of
hands
the
into
delivery
and
obligor
American Smelting & P. Co. v. Belden Min. Co., supra, n. 27.
without
'Thus, if the assignor's claim was based on an informal promise
claim was
sufficient consideration, the assignee has no right. If the assignor's
promised
voidable for fraud or infancy, so also is the assignee's. IfBA inhas
and
B sooo, payable after the completion of specified work by B willperson
be condionly after As ship comes in, the right of any assignee from of A's ship.
tional on the completion of the work by B and on the arrival
If the defects in the assignor's right were removable (e.g., by a ratification), they remain so removable after assignment.
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good against the assignor, it is good also against the assignee,
provided it existed before notice of the assignment is received by
the debtor.42 If a first assignee assigns to a second assignee, any
defense that the debtor had against the first assignor is good
against both the first and second assignees; and any additional defense, counterclaim, or set-off that the debtor had against the
first assignee while he was in possession of the claim, or after
the second assignment but before notice thereof by the debtor,
is good against the second assignee.43 Such is the case even
though the assignee in question, or any previous assignee, is a
purchaser for value without notice. A debtor cannot by assignment be put in a worse position in any respect, except so far as
this may result from being indebted to a new and more pressing
creditor.
A difference must be taken, however, with respect to so-called
"latent equities." These are claims of third persons, persons
other than the debtor. The rule followed by the majority of
courts is that the "latent equity" of a third person does not survive an assignment to an innocent purchaser for value. 44 Thus
if the assignor is a mere trustee for X, but he holds a document
that reasonably leads the assignee to believe that the assignor is
unlimited owner and to pay value to him for the assignment, the
claims of X are inferior to those of the assignee. Again, if a
" WILLISTON, CONTRAcrs, §433.
"The point was well argued in Metzgar v. Metzgar, I Rawle 227 (Pa.,

1829). Counsel said: "Notice puts an end to all privity between the assignor
and obligor, and the assignee becomes the owner of the bond, subject to any
existing equity against the obligee. After notice of the assignment, a new
contract arises between the obligor and the assignee, who holds a chose in
action no more negotiable than it was in the hands of the obligee. If he
transfers it, he does so liable to all the equity arising from the contract between him and the obligor. If this be not the case, the effect of an assignment
would be to make the instrument negotiable." The court agreed, Gibson, C. J.,
saying: "At the time of the assignment, the right of defalcation (set-off)
existed in full force between the obligor and the intermediate assignee. By
what right, then, can the latter put a subsequent assignee in a more advantageous situation than he held himself? In this state, no assignee, whether
legal or equitable, can affect to be prejudiced by want of notice; it being his
duty, as established by many decisions, to sound the obligor before he parts
with his money, as to the amount actually due." In accord is Martin v. Richardson, 68 N. C. 255 (1873). (A owed B on bond. B assigned to C, who
at that time already owed A on another bond. Later C assigned back to B,
who had no notice of C's debt to A. Held, A has a set-off against B.)
"Ames, Purchase for Value Without Notice, I HAv. L. REV. 7,8 (i886).
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creditor, the holder of a right, is induced by the fraud of X to
assign the right to X, and X thereafter assigns to an innocent purchaser for value, the latter is not affected by the "equities' of the
defrauded creditor-the first assignor. 45 The debtor is not the
possessor of these "equities." He would have no sure defense
even as against X, the defrauder; although if he has knowledge
of the fraud he would be well advised to interplead X and the
defrauded creditor. In such an interpleader the latter could win
as against X, but not (by the majority rule) as against the innocent second assignee. This is the rule in the case of other kinds
of property, and there seems to be no sufficient reason for applying a different rule in the case of contract rights. They, too, are
:'property." The reasons for protecting an innocent purchaser
for value are the same in both classes of cases and uniformity is
desirable.
SuccEssivE ASSIGNMENTS BY THE SAME ASSIGNOR

Where the holder of a right makes two successive assignments thereof to two different persons.there has been much conflict in the solution of the problems inrolved. Some of this conflict cannot be explained away. Thus, the English rule is that the
right against the debtor belongs to that assignee who first gives
notice to the debtor of his assignment.4 6 Most of the American
jurisdictions refuse to follow this rule,47 and hold that the right
is in the first assignee except in two classes of cases, as follows:
i. The right belohgs to the second assignee if the prior assignment was itself inoperative for any reason and no such reason
"Putnam v. Clark, 29 N. J. Eq
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(1878), (bond and mortgage) ; Ever-

sole v. Maull, 5o Md. 95 (1878) ; Ambrose v. Evans, 66 Calif. 74, 4 Pac. 96o
(1884), (certificate of stock). Contra: Cutts v. Guild, 57 N. Y. 2a9 (1874),

(judgment debt); Blackman v. Lehman, 63 Ala. 547 (i879), (bonds assigned
by bailee) ; Commercial Bank v. Burch, 40 Ill. App. 505 (18o); Sutherland
v. Reeve, 41 Ill. App. 295 (i8po), 151 Ill. 384, 38 N. E. 130 ('894). Some
of the cases contra can doubtless be reconciled on the ground that the assignor
did not have the indicia of ownership.
"Dearle v. Hall, 3 Russ. 1 (823) ; Foster v. Cockerell, 3 Cl. & F. 456,
(H. L., 1835); Adamson v. Paonessa, i8o Calif. i57, 179 Pac. 88o (igig).
'Salem Trust Co. v. Mfrs. Finance Co., 264 U. S. 182 (1924), discussed
in 33 YALE L. J. 767 (1924); Muir v. Schenck, 3 Hill, 228 (N. Y., 1842).
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exists as to the second. This is self-explanatory. An example is
a case in which the first assignment was a mere oral expression
of gift and the second was for value.
2. The prior assignee's right will be extinguished and the
duty of the obligor will be to the subsequent assignee in case the
latter pays value without knowledge of the prior assignment and
in reasonable reliance on a document evidencing the existence
of the right in the assignor and negligently left in the assignor's
48
possession by the prior assignee.
An innocent assignee for value should be protected against
a prior assignee who made it possible for the assignor to perpetrate a fraud. If the prior assignee knew or ought to have known
of the existence of a document evidencing the existence of the
right in the assignor and that its possession would enable the
assignor to induce a reasonably prudent person to pay value for
another assignment, the law compels the prior assignee to bear the
loss (unless he can collect from the defrauder), and confers the
right upon the subsequent innocent assignee for value. The document may be either a negotiable or a non-negotiable instrument.
It may be a formal bond, a certificate of stock, a savings bank
book, or an insurance policy. The only limitation upon its character is that it must be a document that is so customarily surrendered upon payment or assignment that the inference of nonpayment and non-assignment may reasonably be drawn from its
continued possession by the assignor.
For the second assignee to be preferred, there must be an
element of "estoppel" in the broad general use of that word.
Merely obtaining possession of such a document with actual
knowledge of an earlier assignment or without paying value in
reliance on it will not make the second assignment superior to the
first. It is believed that it is no longer sound to prefer the sec"Herman v. Conn. Mut. L. Ins. Co, 2x8 Mass. 181, ioS N. E. 45o (1914) ;
Bridge v. same, isa Mass. 343, 25 N. E. 62 (i8go) ; Maybin v. Kirby, 4 Rich.
Eq. 105 (S. C., x851). The second assignee may also be preferred if he made
inquiry of the debtor and was induced to become a purchaser for value by the
fact that the debtor had received no notice of a prior assignment. See Salem
Trust Co. v. Mfrs. Finance Co., supra.
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ond assignee on the basis9 of the ancient distinction between "equi4
able" and "legal" title.
It has also been said that the second assignee is in all jurisdictions preferred over the first if he is an innocent purchaser for
value and gets payment, gets a judgment, or enters into a novation with the debtor.50 In these cases, however, whatever right
the second assignee has is a very different right from the one that
the creditor purported to assign to him. His rights are either
"property" rights 51 or "judgment" rights or "novation" rights,
determined solely by the new transaction and not by the assignment. The assignment to him gave him the power to discharge
the debtor, as long as the debtor had no notice of the first assignment and no longer. 2 This power to discharge is not restricted
to the three methods above named. A sealea release, an accord
and satisfaction, a judgment on the merits in favor of the debtor,
and an award of an arbitrator would all operate to discharge the
debtor.5 3 By a sealed release or by a judgment or award in
favor of the debtor, the second assignee would get no rights what-

ever. By the other methods he would get the rights appropriate

to the method, but not the right of an assignee-the same right
in substance against the debtor that the assignor had.
It should be observed that this power to discharge the debtor
is not dependent upon the second assignee's being innocent. It
is exactly the same power that the guilty creditor had prior to notice to the debtor. It depends upon the debtor's lack of notice
of the first assignment and upon the fact that the debtor is justified in believing that the second assignment is a valid one. If,
however, the second assignee is not an innocent purchaser for
value, he will have to account to the first assignee for whatever
he gets out of the new transaction whereby the debtor is disaSee 33 YA.E L. J.768 (1923), n.
which "title" can exist.

i5. There is no res or "fund" to

"Aus,

CASES o TRUSTS, 328 n.
He may keep the money paid to him in good faith by the debtor. Rabinowitz v. People's Bank,235 Mass. io2, 136 N. E. 425 (192o).
SWnasToN, CONTRAMCS, §433.

" Two of these, of course, are not the exercise of a "power" by the as-

signee; nor, indeed, is a judgment in favor of the assignee.
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charged. Indeed in some instances the second assignee may be
liable in damages to the first as for a tort. In this respect, if he
had knowledge of the first assignment, he is in the same position
as the guilty creditor would be in if he should discharge the
debtor after having assigned to an assignee.
If the debtor has notice of the first assignment, the second
assignee has no power of discharge, however innocent he may be.
A debtor with notice must fight all other claimants at his peril,
using a bill of interpleader when necessary. A voluntary payment to the second assignee would not affect the right of the prior
assignee; nor would a judgment obtained by the second assignee
or a new contract in the form of a novation. Yet the second assignee would have the same "property," "judgment," or "novation" rights against the debtor that he would have had if his assignment had itself been effective. These rights are not the rights
of an assignee.
Arthur L. Corbin.
Yale University Law School.

